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Anecdotal evidence and recent empirical work suggest that music 
piracy has differential effects on artists depending on their popularity. 
Existing theoretical literature cannot explain such differential effects 
since it is exclusively concerned with single-firm models. We present a 
model with two types of artists who differ in their popularity. We 
assume that the consumers' costs of illegal downloads increase with 
the scarcity of a recording, and that scarcity is negatively related to the 
artist's popularity. Moreover, we allow for a second source of revenues 
for artists apart from CD sales. These alternative revenues depend on 
an artist's recognition as measured by the number of consumers who 
obtain his recording either by purchasing the original or downloading 
a copy. Our findings for the more popular artist generalize a result 
found by Gayer and Shy (2006) who show that piracy is beneficial to 
the artist when alternative revenues are important. In our model, 
however, this does not carry over to the less popular artist, who is 
often harmed by piracy even when alternative revenues are important. 
We conclude that piracy tends to reduce musical variety. 
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In the course of the last two decades, the economics of information goods has become a
very lively discipline. Information goods, dened broadly by Shapiro and Varian (1999, p.
3) as \anything that can be digitized," have the particular property that they can be copied
basically without quality degradation. This makes them vulnerable to copyright infringement.
Music is the information good that has suered most severely from the violation of intellectual
property rights. Piracy of music has been rampant since the emergence of Internet-based le
sharing networks in the late 1990s. The music industry claims that this kind of private,
noncommercial piracy is threatening the creation of music at large. Musicians themselves
seem to be divided over whether piracy is good or bad, as a survey of American musicians
and songwriters by the Pew Institute (2004) has shown. Pop star Robbie Williams has been
quoted as saying that piracy is \great" (The Economist, 2003), and several artists have
released their songs for free on the Internet.
At a theoretical level, economists have been studying the welfare implications of copying
for some time. The basic trade-o policymakers are facing in designing copyright legislation
is between under-utilization and under-production of intellectual property (see Romer, 2002).
Since information goods are largely non-rival (an individual's consumption of the good does
not aect the quantity of the good available to others), ecient consumption requires all
consumers with a willingness-to-pay exceeding the (small) cost of reproduction to have access
to the good. Therefore, at least in the short run, consumers almost always benet from the
availability of copies.
Given that the development of an information good is typically associated with a high xed
cost, the producer would make a loss if he set the price at marginal cost (i.e., reproduction
cost). Copyright confers some market power to the producer and thereby makes market pro-
vision possible. Unauthorized reproduction, however, results in the good being only partially
excludable, and thus erodes the producer's market power. The resulting decline in prots
reduces the producer's incentive to create. This leads to a problem of underprovision. Ac-
cordingly, the most basic models, relying on self-selection of consumers in the spirit of Mussa
and Rosen (1978), predict piracy to be harmful to producers, which entails in the long run
also negative repercussions on consumers due to reduced incentives to create (Belleamme,
2003; Yoon, 2002; Bae and Choi, 2006).
There are several reasons why there may actually be less of a conict between consumptive
eciency and incentives for producers than this discussion suggests. A variety of papers have
shown that it may sometimes be protable for the rm to allow some degree of piracy.1 The
1 We do not only refer to the obvious case where the costs of complete prevention are so high that producers
prefer to let some consumers obtain the product for free. As noted by King and Lampe (2003, p. 272), research
2rst case is when producers can indirectly appropriate the consumers' rent from copying by
charging a higher price to those buyers who are going to have more copies made from their
originals (Liebowitz, 1985). The second case is the presence of positive network eects on
the demand side. If a consumer's valuation depends on how many others are consuming the
good, piracy allows the monopolist to take advantage of network eects while maintaining
a high price and extracting surplus from high-valuation consumers (Conner and Rumelt,
1991; Takeyama, 1994; Shy and Thisse, 1999). The third case is sampling: since music is an
experience good and tastes are heterogeneous, consumers do not know beforehand whether
or not they like a particular piece of music. File sharing enables consumers to try out new
musical genres and artists, which may under some conditions increase demand (Peitz and
Waelbroeck, 2006b; Zhang, 2002).2
In a contribution specically dealing with the music industry, Gayer and Shy (2006) point
to a possible conict between artists and publishers as to the desirability of unauthorized
reproduction of their works. The argument is based on the observation that record sales are
not the only source of income for artists (e.g., live concerts). While publishers may be harmed
by piracy, artists may benet from the increased recognition of their work that piracy brings
about.
From an empirical point of view, le sharing can provide insights regarding the impact of
unauthorized copying (in particular for testing the dierent hypotheses put forward by the
theoretical literature). So far, there is only limited support for a positive eect of piracy on
demand. On the contrary, most empirical studies indicate that the record industry is being
harmed (Hui and Png, 2003; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004; Zentner, 2006; Liebowitz, 2008).
One exception is the investigation by Oberholzer and Strumpf (2007) who nd that piracy
has no statistically discernible eect on album sales. Apart from this controversial result, one
interesting point raised by their work is that the impact of piracy may vary across artists:
some may gain while others may lose. Specically, there is heterogeneity of the eect of
downloading on sales between sales categories. The top selling quartile of albums is positively
aected by downloads, while the lowest selling quartile is negatively aected.
In this paper, we present a model with two types of artists that can account for dierential
eects of piracy on high- and low-selling musicians. Its originality lies in the assumption of
popularity-dependent copying costs. That is, consumers' cost of downloading depends on an
artist's level of popularity (assumed exogenous). This modeling is motivated by the obser-
vation that, on average, it is much more time-consuming to nd and download a recording
from a little known artist than a very popular song. Following Gayer and Shy (2006), we
on law and economics tells us that this may apply to any unlawful activity provided enforcement is costly.
2 For a review of the literature on piracy, see Peitz and Waehlbroeck (2006a).
3also incorporate a feature explaining why some artists may be in favor of piracy while others
oppose it by introducing an alternative source of revenues for artists. We do not, however,
address the conict of interest that may exist between artists and record labels.
Our results conrm the nding obtained in a dierent setting by Gayer and Shy (2006)
according to which artists can be better o with piracy than without it if alternative revenues
are important. But this applies in an unrestricted way only to the more popular artist. The
less popular artist may still be worse o under piracy even if alternative revenues are set
at their highest possible level. At rst glance, this may appear counterintuitive since higher
downloading costs should shield the little known artist from the adverse eects of piracy to
some degree. However, the way in which the artists can benet from piracy is by using it to
their advantage. In fact, copying constitutes a cheap way of distributing an artist's recording
to a greater part of his potential audience, thereby increasing the alternative revenues which
are assumed to be linked to the total number of consumers who are knowledgeable about his
music. If the less popular artist's popularity is in a middle range where downloading costs
are not yet prohibitively high so that his music is still pirated to some extent but not enough
to reach a sucient level of non-CD sale revenues, piracy reduces his prot. From a welfare
perspective, this means that piracy is detrimental at least for musical variety.
We develop a model that takes into account that piracy may aect artists in dierent ways
depending on their level of popularity. To do this, we start from the simple framework of a
monopolist selling to a continuum of consumers who self-select according to their willingness
to pay. Interpreting the rm as being an artist, we extend that framework by introducing a
second artist. We assume that each of the two artists sells a single good (one can think of the
goods indierently as single songs or entire albums), and that they dier in their popularity.
Their levels of popularity are exogenously given, and consumers like only one of the two
goods. This implies that there is no competition between artists; both are monopolists in the
market for their respective product. Apart from the sales of their CDs, artists have a second
source of revenues, positively related to the number of users of the good. One can think of
concerts, advertising, or television appearances, for example.
One of the artists, referred to as the \star," is more popular than the other. Copies of
the most popular artists' recordings are easier to obtain on le-sharing networks than those
of relatively unknown artists because, in general, the number of people sharing those les is
larger. We capture this property by supposing that there are higher downloading costs (for
consumers) for the less popular artist's music. Intuitively, we would expect this modelling
to result in a lesser eect of piracy on the \underground" artist, while the star should suer
more. However, this eect might be counterbalanced by the fact that opportunities to make
money out of alternative sources increase with \stardom." Piracy, by expanding the user base
4of a recording, leads to higher revenues from these other sources. If a star's music is both more
demanded and easier to download and is therefore copied more, we should expect that the star,
while losing more in terms of CD sales, also benets more from the increased dissemination of
his recording than the less popular artist. In the formal analysis that follows, we examine the
relative strength of these two eects and determine which conditions determine the respective
impact of piracy on the two artists.
The model vis- a-vis the literature
The general self-selection setup of the model draws on Yoon (2002). There are also similar-
ities with other models in the literature. We now discuss briey such common features and
elaborate on what distinguishes the current model from the existing literature.
First, like in Zhang (2002), we assume that there are two artists: a star and an under-
ground artist. However, whereas Zhang allows for competition between the two artists who in
his case produce horizontally dierentiated but (imperfectly) substitutable goods (the artists
being located at the ends of the classic Hotelling line), we assume that the two goods are
no substitutes so that demands are independent. This means that, for reasons exogenous to
the model (tastes), consumers are exclusively drawn to one style of music and do not derive
any utility from consuming the other (this is, of course, an extreme assumption). Moreover,
\stardom" is not dened in terms of the nancial capacity of the label supporting the artist
(as in Zhang), but rather in terms of the proportion of the population who prefer an artist's
music to the other's. Also in Alcal a and Gonz alez-Maestre (2010), the two types of artist
compete.
Second, we follow Gayer and Shy (2006) in introducing a second source of revenues for
artists. Gayer and Shy, who model a conict of interest between artists and labels, leave the
decision of how to price the CD solely to the record company which is assumed to ignore the
artist's interest in setting the price. The artist gets a share of the label's prot. By contrast,
we consider only a single entity which maximizes its total prot taking into account all the
artist's revenues. This can be seen as a special case of Gayer and Shy's approach where all
the share of the prot goes to the artist and where the artist takes the pricing decision.
Taking a closer look at the pricing decision, it is clear that both the assumption that
the record company sets the price without regard to the implications for the artist and the
alternative assumption that the artist sets the price are extreme cases. If we accept that there
is at least some degree of competition between record companies on the \market for artists,"
record companies cannot altogether ignore the artists' interests. If there is suciently strong
competition for signing promising artists, we may actually converge to the case where the
record companies set the price of CDs as if they were the artist.
5Alcal a and Gonz alez-Maestre (2010) use an OLG model to endogenize the number of
stars. They incorporate promotion costs that can be reduced by using piracy as a promotion
device. We disregard the promotion component that adds, as the authors show, an incen-
tive to allow piracy, and we focus instead on another transmission channel: the presence of
popularity-dependent copying costs. That is, we allow the costs that consumers incur when
downloading a song from a le-sharing network to vary across artists depending on their
popularity. Specically, since the songs of little known artists are in relatively scarce supply,
they are costlier to download than stars' music.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we derive the artists' pricing decision. In Section 4, we examine the welfare
eects of piracy, the emphasis being on long-term incentives to create. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 Model setup
There are two artists i: a popular artist (\star," denoted by the subscript s), and a less
popular artist (\underground," denoted by the subscript u), producing products that are
suciently horizontally dierentiated for the cross-price elasticity of the demand for each
product to be zero (their products are neither substitutes nor complements). Both of them
are monopolists and their production technology is represented by the ane cost function
Ci(q) = cq + Fi for q > 0, and Ci(0) = 0; (1)
where q is the quantity of reproductions of the recording (CDs), c is a constant per-unit cost
which is the same for both artists, and Fi is the xed cost of creating the recording (which
may dier between the artists).
There is a mass 1 of consumers, a proportion  of which appreciate (only) the star's
music, while the remaining (1   ) like (only) the less-known artist's works, with 1
2 <  < 1.
Consumers dier in their valuation for music denoted i, with i = s;u, where the index s
represents those consumers who prefer the star and u those preferring the underground artist.
Both types of consumers have valuations uniformly distributed on [0;1].3
3 A more general formulation would consist in letting valuations be distributed on [0;i]. This would allow
for the possibility that the top valuation for the star may be dierent from that for the less-popular artist, i.e.
s 6= u. One could make the argument that the highest valuation may be higher within consumers who like
the star than within those loving the underground artist. A justication could come from the possible existence
of network eects: If the willingness to pay of consumers depends positively on the total number of people
who are knowledgeable about the recording, the top valuation for the star may be higher than that for the
less-popular artist. However, the argument for network eects is rather weak in the case of music. Therefore,
it is dicult to see why the respective top-valuation consumer's appreciation for the star should be greater
than for less-known artist, absent objective dierences in quality. Then, we should assume s = u = , and
without loss of generality we can normalize  to 1.
6Consumers have unit demand for the artists' product. They have two ways to obtain the
product: they can either buy the original at a price pi, or download a copy on a le-sharing
network. The consumers' cost of copying depends on the scarcity of the good, i.e., the star's
music is less costly to copy than the unknown artist's music. This is because it is easier to nd
popular artists' recordings on le-sharing networks than very rare works. In particular, the
cost may include the opportunity cost of time spent searching for and downloading the le.
Given that copying of most musical recordings is illegal, the cost may also include the expected
cost of detection by law enforcement authorities (Crampes and Laont, 2002), although it is
not clear whether this would dier between the two artists. Denoting di the cost of copying
artist i, we assume du > ds, i.e., copying the less popular musician is costlier than copying
the star. Therefore, the utility of a consumer with valuation i is given by
Ui =
8
> > > <
> > > :
i   pi if she buys the original
i   di if she copies
0 otherwise.
The parameter  < 1 represents the quality of the copy relative to that of the original.
Presumably  is close to one. In fact, improvements in compression technology have made
dierences in sound quality quite small, although, of course, there remains some quality
degradation due to lacking cover, song lyrics and other material included with the original of
the recording.4
Artists have two sources of income: sales of their recordings, and revenues from various
sources such as concerts, merchandizing, licensing, advertising, or television appearances,
to name just a few. We assume that revenues other than CD sales depend positively on the
artists' recognition as measured by the number of agents who consume their music (regardless
of whether they bought or copied it). Moreover, there are increasing returns with respect to
the number of users: marginal revenue from the alternative sources is increasing in the total
number of distributed recordings. This reects the fact that a small number of highly popular
musicians get the bulk of lucrative advertising contracts and television appearances. Also,
there are likely to be increasing returns to scale for live performances, and consumers are
willing to pay higher prices to see top acts. Accordingly, the revenue function of each artist
takes the form
R(q;x) = P(q)q + (q + x); with (0) = 0;0 > 0;00 > 0; (2)
where P(q) is inverse demand for CDs and () is other revenues, while x is the number
of copies made (so that x + q is the total number of users of the recording). For the sake of
4 It should also be noted that new technologies such as the Blu-ray Disc have once again introduced more
of quality wedge between illegally downloaded and legally sold versions of an album.
7concreteness and simplicity, we suppose in the following that () is quadratic, i.e.
(q + x) = (q + x)2;
where the parameter  > 0 determines the importance of non-CD sale revenues in the artists'
income.
Interestingly, this (quadratic) specication also arises naturally when the demand for live
performances (as one particular source of alternative revenues) is explicitly modeled, as in the
model of Gayer and Shy (2006). Our specication can therefore be interpreted as a reduced
form of a model where the artist has a second activity whose demand depends (linearly) on
the number of distributed recordings.
Given this setup, we assume that artists set the price of the recording (or equivalently,
since both are monopolists, the quantity qi) so as to maximize their prot which we dene in
gross terms (before subtraction of the xed creation cost Fi), i.e. i = Ri(qi)   cqi.
As far as terminology is concerned, we should stress one important distinction. In what
follows, we use the term popularity to refer to the (exogenous) proportion of consumers who
like a given artist (i.e.,  or 1   ), whereas by an artist's recognition we mean the total
number of distributed recordings (legally sold originals plus illegally downloaded copies).
3 Prot maximization
3.1 No piracy
Suppose rst that copying is not possible, so that users only have the choice between buying
the good and refraining from consuming it. Then, consumers buy if i   pi  0, otherwise,
they don't consume. Hence, the demand addressed to the artists is
Ds(ps) = (1   ps) for the star artist, and
Du(pu) = (1   )(1   pu) for the less popular artist.
We can calculate inverse demand to obtain:








Using the revenue function specied in (2), and substituting for P(q), we obtain marginal
revenue:














The monopolists maximize prots by equalizing marginal revenue and marginal cost (given
by c). This yields the optimal quantities and optimal prices under the no piracy regime











(1   )(1   c)
2(1   (1   ))
;p0
u =
1 + c   2(1   )
2(1   )
: (3)
These follow directly from the rst-order conditions of the artists' maximization problem.
In addition, for the second order condition to be satised, we need  < 1
 (which implies
also  < 1
1 ). This restriction on  makes sure that marginal revenue is downward sloping
for both artists. If it is not satised (i.e., if  is too large), so that marginal revenue slopes
upward, the artists want to produce the highest possible quantity since any loss from CD
sales is more than compensated by the gain in terms of other revenues. For both artists to
produce a strictly positive quantity, we also need consumers' maximum willingness to pay to
exceed marginal cost, that is c < 1.
It is instructive to compare these optimal price-quantity pairs to those that would prevail
in the absence of a second source of revenues (which corresponds to  = 0). In that case, prices
would be 1+c
2 for both artists and thus higher than those given by (3) (accordingly, optimal
quantities would be smaller). This is to be expected since non-CD sale revenues depend
positively on the artists' recognition. In the absence of piracy, recognition is equivalent to
the number of CDs sold. Hence, the artist nds it optimal to lower his price in order to gain
recognition and benet from increased non-CD sale revenues.
We can then also calculate the gross prot 0
i of each artist i, dened as the prot before
deduction of the xed development cost. Since, in the absence of piracy, x = 0, we have
0
i = Ri(q0
i )   cq0
i = (Pi(q0











(1   )(1   c)2
4(1   (1   ))
(6)
Since by assumption  > 1=2 , the prot of the underground artist is lower than the
star's. The same applies to the quantity sold. At the same time, the price charged by the
less-popular artist is higher than the star's. This is due to the convexity of the function ()
which determines non-CD sale revenues. In fact, for a given price, the star faces a larger
9Figure 1: Self-selection of consumers
demand, and can exploit the gains from recognition more easily. More precisely, his marginal
revenue from sources other than CD sales is higher than for the less popular artist. Therefore,
he chooses to set his price below the level chosen by the less popular artist.
One interesting consequence of this is that the star serves a higher percentage of his
potential audience than the less popular artist. This can be easily veried by taking the
ratios q0
s= and q0
u=(1   ) which represent the part of each artist's potential audience that
is actually being served.
3.2 Piracy
Now suppose that consumers can either buy or copy the product sold by the artists. Depend-
ing on their valuation, consumers either buy or copy or do not consume at all:
 if i   pi  i   di  0, they buy the original;
 if i   pi < i   di, but i   di  0, they download an unauthorized reproduction;
 if i   pi < 0 and i   di < 0, they do not consume the good.
We can then determine the threshold values of i which delimit non-consumers from
copiers, and copiers from buyers. They are depicted in Figure 1 (which is valid as long as
pi > di


















To illustrate the substitution of copies for originals that takes place, suppose that the price
for music, pi, was above di
 in the absence of piracy. This implies that pi <
pi di
1  . Suppose
for a second that the artist leaves his price unchanged in the presence of le sharing. If we
rewrite the consumer's utility if copying as i  (1 )i  di, we see that the cost of copying
can be decomposed in two parts: the reproduction cost di which is constant across consumers,
and the degradation cost (1   )i which is proportional to the consumer's valuation. For
the consumers with the lowest valuation (between 0 and di
 ), the possibility to copy doesn't
change anything: they still don't nd it worthwhile to consume the good. Similarly, the
highest-valuation consumers continue to buy the original even when copies are available since
10their total copying costs (dened as the sum of reproduction and degradation costs) exceed
the price. However, in between those two groups, there are two kinds of consumers. Some
consumers who would not have consumed the good in the absence of piracy now nd it
worthwhile to download a copy. Some others, though, who would have purchased the original
if piracy were not an option, now switch to the alternative procurement technology that
consists in downloading the le. Those latter consumers, located between pi and
pi di
1  are
the ones who substitute copies for originals.
From Figure 1, we can see that a necessary condition for piracy to take place is di
 < 1.
Otherwise, copying is never an option for any consumer. Moreover, if pi  di
 , there is no
copying in the respective artist's market. This oers the artist a possibility to deter piracy.
We come back to this below when we study the pricing decision. At this stage, the important

















, respectively. For prices
below the kink, demand is the same as before. For prices above the kink, demand can be
easily derived from the scheme presented in Figure 1 above.
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1  if qu  (1   )(1   du
 )
(1   )(1  
qu
1 ) + du if qu < (1   )(1   du
 )
(10)
Figure 2 shows the resulting kinked demand function in the case of the star. The less
popular artist faces a similar demand (it suces to replace  by (1   ) and ds by du).
To deduce marginal revenue, notice that under piracy, revenue from other sources does
not solely depend on the number of recordings sold. Specically, as long as copying takes
place (that is, for prices above the limit price) the recognition of the artist is constant. This is
because the number of consumers who remain out of the market (that is, who don't consume)
is determined only by exogenous parameters ( and d) as we can see from Figure 1.
11Figure 2: The kinked demand curve
The total number of agents consuming an artist's product is also constant and thus inde-
pendent of q. It is given by (1   ds
 ) and (1   )(1   du
 ), respectively. We therefore obtain
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) if qs  (1   ds
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)(1  
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1   2qu( 1
1    ) if qu  (1   )(1   du
 )
(1   )(1  
2qu
1 ) + du if qu < (1   )(1   du
 )
(12)
This is illustrated in Figure 3, where the bold curve represents marginal revenue. The
marginal revenue function exhibits a discontinuity at the point corresponding to the kink of
the demand curve. If it were not for the parameter , this would not present a problem.
However, the presence of  may lead to technical diculties if the discontinuity is such that
marginal cost can intersect MR twice. This occurs whenever  is too large. In fact, the slope
of the part of the curve that is located to the right of the discontinuity depends on . As 
increases, the second part of the MR curve becomes atter.
We can impose a restriction on  to rule out the possibility of double intersection. As it
turns out, the necessary assumption is not a strong one. In fact, we must have (for the star)
12Figure 3: The marginal revenue


























If the restriction is met with equality, the marginal revenue function for the star is contin-
uous. Similarly, for the underground artist, we need  

2(1 ), but this condition is implied
by the condition for the star.
We assume in the following that condition (13) is satised. There are two reasons why
this should not be considered a strong assumption. First, the numerical example in the
following subsection shows that in spite of this restriction (which places an upper bound on
the importance of alternative sources of revenue), the part of non-CD sale revenues in gross
prots can still be very signicant (especially for the star). Second, if, as we should assume,
 is close to one, this is basically the same assumption as the one we would need in order
to exclude dumping (i.e., price below marginal cost) under the no-piracy regime.5 Since CDs
certainly were not priced below their marginal cost of production before the emergence of
large-scale private piracy via le-sharing networks, this does not seem like much of a stretch.
We can then study the pricing decision of the artists when piracy is possible. Depending
on where marginal cost intersects marginal revenue (see Figure 3), we have four possible cases.
We can use the terminology introduced by Bain (1956) to classify the rst three of those cases
5 To exclude dumping, we must have p
0









13as accommodation, deterrence and blockade. Following the convention in the literature, the
conditions for each of those cases can be expressed as depending on the reproduction cost di.
For the star artist:
 if
ds <
(1    + c)
2   
(14)
we are in the situation where the artist accommodates piracy. The optimal price is










2(1 ) , implying that p1
s =
1 +ds c
2 . In gure 3, this corresponds to the
case where marginal cost intersects the upper part of marginal revenue (left of the kink).












(1    + c)
2   
 ds <
(1 + c   2)
2(1   )
; (15)
the optimal price is the limit price p2
s = ds
 which deters pirates. The corresponding


























(1 + c   2)
2(1   )
; (16)
reproduction costs are too high for piracy to present a threat to the artist. This cor-
responds to the case where marginal cost intersects the lower part of marginal revenue
in gure 3. Piracy is blockaded and the artist can charge the monopoly price under no
piracy, p0
s = 1   1 c
2(1 ).
 For completeness, we also need to consider the case where c > 1    + ds. In this
case, the producer cannot gain a positive margin on the sales of his recordings. In the
absence of other revenues, the market would break down. However, since as soon as
q is strictly positive, the artist - due to piracy - reaches the same level of recognition













regardless of how many CDs he sells. Therefore, he sets the
price at 1  +ds  ", where " is small, so that he sells an innitesimal quantity of his
recording (albeit at a loss). Thanks to piracy, this enables him to reap the benets of
his recognition.
Once again, thanks to the symmetry of the problem, the same holds for the underground
artist, replacing  by (1   ) and ds by du.
14No piracy Piracy
Star Underground Star Underground
Quantity sold 0.333 0.133 0.111 0.167
Price 0.5 0.6 0.375 0.458
Total prot 0.111 0.044 0.139 0.038
Non-CD sale revenues 0.056 0.009 0.134 0.017
Non-CD sale revenues/prot 50% 20% 96.7% 45.1%
Part of audience served 50% 40% 16.7% 50%
Part pirating 0 0 61.1% 5.6%
Total part consuming 50% 40% 77.8% 55.6%
Table 1: A numerical example
3.3 A numerical example
The following table presents some key results of the model by means of a numerical example.
We compare the no-piracy and the piracy regimes assuming, for that example, that condition
(14) is fullled for both artists, i.e., di <
(1 +c)
2  , and therefore that both artists' music is
pirated. Furthermore, we set the importance of non-CD sale revenues, as measured by , at
slightly below its highest possible value still satisfying the restriction imposed by (13). The
table is based on the following parameter values:  = 2=3; = 3=4;c = 1=3;ds = 1=6;du =
1=3; = 1=2.
For the no-piracy regime, the example exhibits all the properties discussed above: the star
sells a higher quantity, charges a lower price, and makes more prots than the less popular
artist. His revenues from alternative sources are much higher than the less popular artist's;
they account for 50 percent of his prots (compared to 20 percent for the underground artist).
He also serves a larger percentage of his potential audience than the less popular artist.
The picture changes when piracy is possible. While both artists reduce their price in the
face of \competition" from pirates, the number of CDs sold by the star falls by two thirds
whereas the underground artist actually sells more than before. The quantity sold by the
underground artist now exceeds what the star sells. This pattern is reversed when we look
at prots: The star benets from piracy and increases his prots above the level witnessed in
the absence of piracy, whereas the less popular artist loses. Whether there is some regularity
to this phenomenon (the eect of piracy on the artists' prots having opposite signs for the
star and the less-popular artist) is discussed in the following subsection.
Other noteworthy features include the fact that the star now gains 97 percent of his prots
15from activities other than CD sales, and that 61 percent of his potential customers download
a copy of his product while only 17 percent buy the original (we cannot, however, exactly
quantify the substitution eect since the artist changes his price in response to the availability
of le sharing). For the less-known artist, only 6 percent of his potential audience pirates
the good. This discrepancy is induced by the fact that the downloading cost for the less
popular artist is twice as high as for the star, which reduces the interval of valuations for
which copying takes place (see Figure 1). For both artists, the total percentage of consumers
who obtain the product in one way or another is considerably higher than without piracy.
4 Welfare analysis
4.1 Short-term welfare
To evaluate the eect of piracy on short-term welfare, we need to compute the total surplus
(net consumer surplus plus prot) under the assumption that both artists are in the market.
There are several problems with this methodology. First, it may not be very meaningful to
calculate surplus in the current model. In the partial equilibrium setting of the model, the
source of non-CD sale revenues is not explicitly modeled: In a way, those revenues fall like
manna from heaven. In reality, somebody has to pay for them. This may not be overly
problematic in the case of concerts, where consumers pay directly for their tickets. However,
it is much more of a concern when we think of other sources of revenue such as advertising
which is sometimes considered wasteful from a social point of view. Still, we could overcome
this problem by making the assumption that consumers derive zero net surplus from these
other activities (i.e., that the artist extracts the entire surplus) since otherwise they would
not pay for them. In other words, we could assume away socially wasteful activities.
Second, however, it is dicult enough to determine whether the artists win or lose from
piracy, let alone quantify the gain or loss, as the following subsection shows. That means
that actually calculating the dierence in surplus between the two regimes (piracy versus no
piracy) is likely to be prohibitively complicated.
Nevertheless, we can make an informed guess about the short-term welfare consequences of
piracy in our model based on other results in the literature. The eect of piracy on consumer
surplus is sure to be positive: in both the case of deterrence and the case of accommodation,
it gives more consumers access to the goods, and prices decrease. One result of the literature
discussed in the introduction is that, in a model with linear demand as in our case, although
producer prots decline, this decline is more than oset by an increase in consumer surplus,
so that the total eect of piracy on social welfare is unambiguously positive (Belleamme
2003). In our case, due to the presence of a second source of revenues for artists, it is not even
16sure that artists' prots decline, as we see below. Therefore, we conclude that in our model,
too, the increase in consumer surplus exceeds any possible decline in prots. This means that
the short-term welfare eect of piracy is positive.
4.2 Long-term welfare
For the long-term consequences of piracy for welfare, the important question is whether the
artists' incentives to produce music remain intact. We thus have to analyze what happens
to their prots under piracy. To do this, we make the assumption that the xed cost Fi of
developing the recording can dier between the artists. Such a dierence might stem from
dierent costs of writing the song, recording and mixing the initial master tape, or from
dierent promotion and advertising expenditures, for example. Assuming that Fi can vary
across artists makes the analysis of long-term welfare straightforward: If at least one artist's
prot deteriorates as a result of piracy, this potentially destroys his incentives to create and
must therefore be considered as detrimental from an ex ante eciency perspective.
Let us assume that the condition for piracy to occur (equation (14)) holds. Piracy is
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Intuitively, we would expect that piracy is more benecial to the musician the greater is
. As the following proposition shows, there is indeed a threshold value of  such that above
that value, the artist is better o with piracy than without it.






above which piracy is benecial for the
star. This threshold is given by the solution of the (second degree) equation (17b).
























The reason for that is that the expression in the second bracket is the quantity produced in
the absence of piracy which, if ds <
(1 +c)
2  , is smaller than the total number of distributed
recordings under piracy (sales and copies, rst bracket). This is true at least as long as  

2
(the restriction imposed on  for marginal revenue to be non-degenerate). So the dierence
in prots strictly increases with .
17The monotonicity of (17b) over the mentioned interval guarantees that there is one and
only one intersection within the interval as long as the function assumes negatives values at
the left extreme of the interval and positive values at the right one.
All we need to show is therefore that s evaluated at  = 0 is negative (rst part of
the proof) while it is positive at  =

2 (second part of the proof). For the rst part of the
proof,  = 0, so we obtain the condition
(1    + ds   c)2 < (1   )(1   c)2; (19)
which can be rewritten as
(   ds)2 < 2(1   c)(   ds)   (1   c)2: (20)
Given the condition c < 1    + ds which is required for the demand to be non-negative, a
sucient condition for (20) to be satised is
(   ds)2 < 2(1   1 +    ds)(   ds)   (1   c)2
and thus
(   ds)2 > (1   c)2: (21)
Using again condition c < 1    + ds and noting that 1   c + ds > ds, a sucient condition
for (21) is (1   c + ds   ds)2 > (1   c)2 ()  < 1, which is always veried.























(2 + 2ds   (1 + c + ds))2
4(1   )(2   )
 0: (22b)
This last condition is always veried, with strict inequality as long as (2 + 2ds   (1 +
c + d)) 6= 0, which corresponds to saying that s = 0 , ds =
(1 +c)
2  , that is, when ds
attains the maximum possible value for which piracy occurs.
If revenues linked to the artists' recognition are important, piracy is benecial to the star.
We can explain this as follows. In the absence of piracy, the artist faces a trade-o between a
higher margin on record sales on the one hand and higher revenues from alternative sources
on the other hand, given that the latter require that he charge a lower price in order to gain
recognition. Piracy gives the artist a way to increase his recognition without having to reduce
his markup and therefore relaxes this constraint. In a way, it enables the artist to charge
18the monopoly price on his residual demand and at the same time to benet from a high level
of recognition and the associated advantages. If non-CD sale revenues are large, this eect
dominates the reduction in the demand for originals that piracy entails. This extends the
result obtained by Gayer and Shy (2006) to the case where the artist himself sets the price
of his CDs.
If we want to make a statement about what happens to the less-known artist's prots, we
have to be more precise about what determines the larger cost of piracy. Since the idea is that
the costs of downloading increase with the scarcity of the artist's recordings, it seems natural
to tie it either to the number of sold recordings or to the artist's popularity. Of course,
in reality, the distribution of a piece of music through the dierent channels is a dynamic
process. At the beginning, the scarcity of a copy depends mainly on the number of CDs
sold and on the willingness of buyers to share the music on le-sharing networks. However,
the distinctive feature of digital copying is that you can make copies of copies without losing
quality. Therefore, even if the number of CDs sold is small, the cost of a download is smaller
for more strongly demanded recordings since they are disseminated faster. Hence, it would
appear that it is appropriate to assume that the cost of a download is linked to the proportion
of the population that appreciates an artist's music. The simplest way to introduce such a
relationship is to assume proportionality of downloading costs with respect to popularity.
Thus, in what follows we assume that du = 
1 ds.
Then, depending on the value of , which determines the degree of (un-)popularity of the
less-known artist, there are three possible cases conditional on ds being such that the star is
pirated:
1. If the star is extremely popular relative to the underground artist, so that the latter's
recordings are very rare, it is prohibitively costly to copy the less-known artist. The









2  , the less-known artist chooses to limit-price his
product in order to deter pirates. This unambiguously hurts his prots compared to
the case without piracy.
In both of those cases, only the star's music is being pirated.
3. If the level of popularity of the less-known artist exceeds a certain value determined
by the condition  <
(1 +c)
ds(2 )+(1 +c), there is piracy for both artists. Then, whether
piracy is benecial to the less-known artist depends on the sign of the dierence between

















(1   )(1   c)2
4(1   (1   ))
 0 (23)
Case (2) and our numerical example above demonstrate that the star may win from piracy
while the less popular artist may lose. To examine under what conditions piracy is detrimental
to the less-known artist even though it is benecial to the star, we now take a closer look at
case (3). As the Proposition above shows, the star is strictly better o with piracy if  =

2.
Plugging this into (23), simplifying by (1   ), and rearranging, we see that the expression




0   1 + 22   33 + 44
4(1   )2(1   )( + 2   )
(24)
where
0 = 23(   1) (25a)
1 = 2(92 + 2(c + 2ds   3) + c2   2c   4ds   3) (25b)
2 = (153 +22(3c+7ds  2)+(5c2 +2c(ds  3)+2d2







Due to the high degree of diculty of the problem, we perform a numerical analysis of
this expression. We conjecture that u is decreasing in  and has a root between 1/2
and
(1 +c)
ds(2 )+(1 +c). Our conjecture is supported numerically for many dierent parameter
congurations. In particular, this is the case for the parameters used in our numerical example
from Section 3.3. Figure 4 shows the graph of the expression that determines the sign of u








conguration:  = 3=4;c = 1=3;ds = 1=6; = 9=16. This corresponds to the parameters used
in the example of section (3.3), with the exception of  which has been set at its maximum
value consistent with (13). As can be seen from Figure 4, u is positive for low values of 
but turns negative from the point where  = 0:58.
The intuition for this result is the following. For values of  close to 1/2, the underground
artist does not dier much in his popularity from the star. Accordingly, the cost of download-
ing his music is only slightly higher than for the star. He therefore benets from the same
20Figure 4: The dierence in the underground artist's prot with and without piracy
eect that the star enjoys which, as described above, consists in getting increased recogni-
tion without having to make concessions regarding the markup on CDs. Initially, this eect
outweighs the substitution of copies for originals caused by the availability of le sharing.
However, as the popularity of the less-known artist decreases, the cost of downloading his
music rises so that less and less consumers copy. This means that the revenues linked to his
recognition fall, and although his CD sales now suer less than the star's, the piracy-induced
reduction in demand can no longer be compensated by alternative revenues. In a way, for this
range of , the underground musician is caught in the middle: he is not popular enough to
replace lost CD sales by revenues out of other sources, but he is too popular for piracy to be
blockaded. In that case, we must conclude that piracy is bad for welfare since, by reducing the
less popular artist's prots, it may keep him out of the market and therefore reduce musical
variety.
In summary, we have seen that the eects of piracy depend very much on the parameters
of the model. Even assuming we are in a conguration where there is piracy of (at least)
the star's music, everything is contingent on  and . If revenues from sources other than
CD sales are important, piracy is benecial for the star. However, it need not be for the less
popular artist if he nds himself in a middle range of popularity where he can enjoy neither
sucient gains from recognition, nor shelter from pirates.
215 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs.
The theoretical literature is largely silent on how piracy may aect dierent types of artists
since it is concerned almost exclusively with single-rm models. By contrast, anecdotal ev-
idence and recent empirical work suggest that copying has dierential eects on artists de-
pending on their popularity.
We propose to deal with this issue by setting up a model with two types of artists who
dier in their popularity, and by letting the cost incurred by consumers when downloading
an artist's recording vary with the artist's level of popularity. More precisely, we assume that
downloading costs increase with the scarcity of a recording, and that scarcity is negatively
related to the artist's popularity. Moreover, we allow for a second source of revenues for
artists apart from CD sales. We make the assumption that these alternative revenues are
an increasing and convex function of an artist's recognition as measured by the number of
consumers who obtain his recording either by purchasing the original or downloading a copy.
Our ndings for the more popular artist generalize a result found in a dierent kind
of setup by Gayer and Shy (2006) who assert that piracy is benecial to the artist when
alternative revenues are important. However, in our model this does not carry over to the
less popular artist, who is found in certain cases to be harmed by piracy even when the
parameter measuring the importance of alternative revenues is set at its maximum. Therefore,
we conclude that piracy is bad for social welfare since it is likely to reduce musical variety.
This negative result may be mitigated when piracy, through its eect on recognition, has
an impact on the probability of an underground artist to become a star, as in Alcal a and
Gonz alez-Maestre (2010), which is likely to occur under some imperfections in the talent
revelation process (see Tervi o, 2009).
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